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Nationalism and Globalization: 
Challenging Assumptions
Jonathan Hearn
This article challenges a set of common assumptions and misconceptions about nation-
alism and globalization. First, nationalism and globalization are historically entwined 
and reinforcing processes, and not fundamentally opposed to each other. Second—and 
closely related—the modern nation-state is premised on interdependence of economic 
and political forms of power, not their opposition. Third, nation-states are highly vari-
able in their powers, resources, and alignments, and form an evolving system, making 
it difficult to say anything sensible about the “fate of the nation-state” in the abstract. 
Fourth, the variable composition of national identities and cultures is considerably 
more complex than a dichotomy between “ethnic” and “civic” types might suggest. 
Together, these arguments point toward the continuing need for an understanding of 
global processes as an outcome of the negotiation of powers between nation-states, not 
as autonomous shaping forces over and above nation-states.
Discussions on nationalism and globalization frequently rely on an over-simplified opposition of these processes that fails to appreciate their 
complex interdependence. This introductory essay aims to challenge this as-
sumption and several others as a way of setting the stage for a wide-ranging 
analysis of nationalism. 
Nationalism theorists have tended to divide into two camps: those who 
emphasize its deep historical roots in various formations of ethnicity and pol-
ity, and those who see it primarily as a modern phenomenon, linked to the 
rise of mass politics, industrialization, and democratization.1 If one accepts 
that nationalism is, at its base, the contemporary expression of pre-modern 
sentiments and identities, then it follows that it will be at odds with modern 
processes, including globalization. However, if one views it as an aspect of 
modernity itself, then this opposition becomes less plausible. 
My first assertion is that while we can always find pre-modern factors 
feeding into the formation of nations, modern nationalism is a sufficiently 
distinctive phenomenon to deserve its own conceptualization. Although social 
groups that share overarching collective identities and make claims to rule 
themselves in particular territories have existed for millennia, modern national-
ism adds two critical further ingredients. First, the spread of literacy and mass 
forms of communication have greatly extended and accelerated ideological 
processes.2 Second, the belief that political legitimacy comes from below—from 
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the people who are subject to that rule—only takes full shape in the modern 
age of democracy and other forms of mass politics. Nationalism, in the sense I 
use it here, is the making of combined claims to identity, territory, and jurisdic-
tion, under these specifically 
modern conditions of com-
munication and legitimiza-
tion.3
In contrast to nation-
alism, there is a tendency to 
conceptualize globalization 
in terms that are too histori-
cally shallow. It is conventional to treat globalization as a very recent process, 
only taking off after World War II, and especially associated with the neoliberal 
turn since the 1970s, specifically with the growth of international finance and 
of various transnational quasi-governmental bodies (the UN, the WTO, the 
IMF, the World Bank, and so forth). It is often conceived in opposition to a 
mid-twentieth century paradigm of the more corporatist and Keynesian welfare 
state, and as a key factor in the decline of that paradigm. To the degree that we 
take that form of the state as emblematic of modern nationalism, globalization 
appears to be subsequent and opposed to it. But this is problematic, because 
nation-states are one of the basic preconditions and drivers of globalizing pro-
cesses, not antecedents, and globalization was one of the conditions of the for-
mation of modern nationalism in the first place. In fact, they are concomitant. 
Nationalism and globalization are complex emergent processes that do 
not have simple origins. It is possible to identify many historical processes that 
prefigure them in some ways: ancient Israel and Greece for nationalism, the 
spread of the Roman Empire and various world religions for globalization.4 
Nonetheless, they are primarily modern processes, and their modern histories 
are deeply entwined. Liah Greenfeld argues that the origins of modern na-
tionalism lie in class transformations of sixteenth-century England.5 Benedict 
Anderson claims that nationalism first took shape among the Creole pioneers, 
European settlers in the colonies in the Americas.6 Others have emphasized the 
competitive dynamic among dynastic and imperial states in Europe in the early 
modern period, raising demands for internal legitimization.7 All these argu-
ments have merit, but I argue that the spatial frame needs to be wider, and the 
temporal frame more specific. 
The crucial, pivotal context for the formation of modern nationalism was 
the world of interactions around the North Atlantic in the eighteenth century.8 
With European colonization of the Americas and the growth of transatlantic 
trade networks, a new worldview evolved as European empires became over-
stretched and unable to maintain systems of rule. A transatlantic milieu of 
intellectuals, especially in the British American colonies and France, elaborated 
new ideas of democracy, republicanism, and collective self-rule that came to the 
forefront in the respective revolutions of 1776 and 1789.9 In other words, mod-
ern nationalism was already substantially global in its origins, arising out of this 
transatlantic commercial context in the eighteenth century, on both sides of the 
Atlantic at the same time, as part of one historical process of transformation.
Nationalism is the making of combined 
claims to identity, territory, and jurisdiction, 
under these specifically modern conditions of 
communication and legitimization.
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Since then, in successive waves, the growth of capitalism around the 
globe has been closely tied to the spread of the nation-state form, first in the 
initial burst of republican revolutions in Europe and the Americas during the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; then in the spread of European 
empires of trade, eventually replaced by an array of decolonizing states; and 
most recently in a wave of new states formed out of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. As particularly powerful modern nation-states have also had explicit 
or implicit imperial ambitions, they have spread economic, political, and 
cultural practices, and spawned new 
nation-states in the face of resistance 
to their goals. These states, in various 
regional formations, have developed 
trade, political, and military alliances 
to protect and advance their interests, 
also contributing to the global exten-
sion of norms and institutions, while 
at the same time further defining national communities of interest. Globaliza-
tion is not a freestanding process, or even the specific project of multinational 
corporations along with other economic actors. It is the outcome of interac-
tions among all kinds of organizational actors—economic, political, military, 
cultural, and ideological—as they try to pursue various interests in a crowded 
world.10 And nation-states are foundational among these organizations.
Next, it is worth saying something more about the typical structure of 
the modern nation-state. As Max Weber observed, these are premised on the 
fundamental alliance between capital and the state.11 States rely on complex 
economic organizations, corporations, banks, and so on, to support their 
legitimacy by supplying employment, tax bases, and sufficient prosperity to 
maintain social order. In turn, these organizations rely on the state to provide 
the necessary legal and administrative integration, including such essentials as 
stable contracts and currencies, in order to go about their business. Whatever 
the chronic tensions, the two are wedded to one another, and the modern state 
has this alliance at its core. Granted, in the twentieth century, command econ-
omy models tried to weld the economic and political forms of organization so 
tightly together that the distinction broke down, but this proved unsuccessful. 
At the other, capitalist end of the spectrum, there is a range of possible de-
grees and manifestations of mutualism between the state and its core economic 
organizations, from the social democratic to the more economically liberal. 
But there is no reason to think the current “long leash” that many economic 
organizations enjoy under regimes more committed to market fundamental-
ism is a permanent state of affairs. The crucial role of states such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom in absorbing private debt and turning it into 
public debt in the wake of the 2007–2008 financial crisis is strong evidence of 
the enduring interdependence of the economic and political dimensions of the 
modern nation-state’s organization.
This has basic implications for the relationship between nationalism and 
globalization. While it is certainly the case that many local communities have 
found themselves at the mercy of footloose capital and weaker states have been 
Globalization is not a freestanding 
process, or even the specific project 
of multinational corporations along 
with other economic actors.
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strong-armed by powerful corporations, the power of the modern company 
dovetails with the power of modern states. The most powerful companies are 
generally housed in the most powerful states. From imperial gunboats support-
ing state-chartered trading organizations, to IMF- and World Bank-imposed 
structural adjustments prying open national markets, it is the combination of 
strong political and economic organizations in symbiotic action that has been 
the dominant agent of globalization. 
This is not to deny that there are conflicts of interest between political 
and economic actors, or that the distributions of power between them can be-
come unbalanced. Again, with the recent global economic downturn in mind, 
there is good reason to think that some economic firms have enjoyed too much 
autonomy. But it does call into question the inevitability of domination of the 
economic over the political, and the impotency of states in the face of global 
capitalism. This is not so much a matter of impotency as of deliberate inac-
tion on the part of those states with the requisite power to act and shape the 
course of events. Those states are generally among the more established and 
stable democracies, so on some level their citizens must take responsibility for 
that inaction as well.
I have just alluded to my third line of argument. One of the liabilities of 
abstract theorizing about the “fate of the nation-state” is a tendency to treat 
nation-states as if they all approximated a single type, the fate of which was 
in question.12 But nation-states come in a wide array of sizes, resource en-
dowments, positioning within international alliances, and degrees of effective 
power.13 It makes little sense to talk of the future of the nation-state in gen-
eral; it makes more sense to address their variable fortunes according to the 
factors listed above. For instance, a significant factor stimulating speculation 
about national futures in Europe has been the growth of the European Union, 
which has appeared for many years to be assimilating sovereignty from its 
member states as it expanded, perhaps eroding national boundaries and self-
determination. But as has been pointed out, the EEC and then the EU came 
about precisely to preserve the European states from mutual destruction and 
from external competition.14 Currently, this political and economic project is 
under severe strain, as Greece and Europe’s other southern states struggle with 
unsustainable levels of debt and unemployment, which rebound on the rest 
of the system. They further struggle with the largest human migrations since 
the end of World War II out of Syria and parts of Africa, driven by a series of 
political, economic, and humanitarian crises. The one-directional historical 
movement toward greater integration is no longer so obvious, as various EU 
countries have shown resistance. Even if the EU weathers these storms and 
continues on its path of integration, it is not immediately obvious that this is 
a sign of the demise of the nation-state model so much as the formation of a 
new macro-polity with the geographic scale and cultural complexity of global 
contenders such as the United States and China. 
My point here is that the pertinent unit of analysis is not the nation-state 
in the abstract, but the overall ecology of power among diverse and actual 
states. Only in this dimension can we see shifting chains of dependence and 
interdependence and the patterns of opposition that serve to sustain various 
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relationships, undermining autonomy in some respects, but reinforcing it in 
others. As long as there are multiple major global and regional power hold-
ing states, there will be multiple less powerful states aligning themselves with 
or between them. Although there are indeed global channels and places of 
mutual influence and impact, these do not yet form truly integrated political, 
economic, or normative systems. There is a “world society” in the limited sense 
of articulating networks of interactions and mutual adjustments, and to some 
degree this involves the spread of various kinds of conventions.15 But there isn’t 
(yet) a stable and integrated system of power structures and policies, which 
would require something approaching “world government.”16 As long as this 
is so, we need to be careful about overstating the case for globalization, and to 
distinguish between causal interactions in a complex world and the emergence 
of genuine systems of social life extending across the globe.
Up to this point, I have used a fairly open conception of the nation-state 
as a single political unit with enough cultural continuity to function, but with-
out making any assumptions about the degree of cultural unity necessary to 
underpin nationalism. I take the view that this is highly variable. Some states 
operate with a high degree of cultural, linguistic, or religious uniformity, but 
others do not. Several liberal democracies have become strikingly multicultural 
in their composition. Despite anxieties in some quarters about this, the effect 
has not been to undermine national unity, but rather to reconstitute it in newer 
and better-adapted terms. Multiculturalism in this sense assumes, nonetheless, 
enough overarching cultural continuity to make the system work. This is the 
rejoinder to those who question whether the nation-state, understood as a close 
fit between a polity and a relatively uniform culture, ever really existed except 
for a few rare exceptions—perhaps Japan or Iceland.17 Nation-states have always 
dealt with, and generated, internal cultural diversity, with our opening classic 
examples of the United States and France as cases in point. “Nation” in this 
general sense needs to be taken as sufficient to the tasks of modern political 
legitimization, not as a badge of cultural homogeneity. Otherwise, it could never 
deal with the diversity and change found in what we normally understand as 
the history of modern nation-states. 
Another convention in the academic literature on nationalism is to talk 
in terms of a contrast between “ethnic” and “civic” forms of nationalism.18 As 
just suggested, within limits, meaningful comparisons along a dimension can 
be made here, but we should disabuse ourselves of the notion of pure types. 
Membership in the most civic of nations is usually an accident of birth, not 
a choice, and civic identities and commitments are made concrete through 
patterns of symbols and other conventions, just as much as ethnic ones are.19 
Nonetheless, both Michael Mann and Jack Snyder have made a useful point 
about an intrinsic ambiguity in modern nationalism.20 At its most basic, the 
doctrine of nationalism says “the people” should rule themselves, but for the 
reasons just given, it is not very clear who “the people” are. In some contexts, 
the people and their elites have constructed themselves more as a demos, which 
is relatively culturally open and has a direct hand in the business of rule. In oth-
ers the people and their elites have constructed themselves more as an ethnos: 
a cultural community whose interests are supposedly met when their political 
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leaders share the same culture as that community, but with little concern for 
the democratic control of power. In other words, the modern nation-state dis-
tinctively gets its legitimacy from 
below—from the mass of  the 
ruled population—but how it 
secures that legitimacy, whether 
through democratic institutions 
or symbolic representations, can 
vary in consequential and danger-
ous ways. 
Apart from this question 
of how ethnically or civically the 
nation is constituted, calls for greater cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
purity are a perennial form of political mobilization in the modern world. Of-
ten, these seem to represent resistance to the tides of globalization, to mobilize 
some groups against others in struggles over limited resources, or to shore 
up embattled local forms of legitimacy. But we need to distinguish carefully 
between nationalism as such and ethnic politics more generally. National-
ism, as I use it here, means the construction and consolidation of a collective 
identity either in pursuit of, or in association with the ongoing reproduction 
of, a self-governing state. Ethnic politics are organized around the interests of 
an ethnically defined group, but need not be concerned with the pursuit or 
consolidation of statehood. 
Modern nation-states are full of ethnic politics, especially in ethnically 
diverse urban settings where ethnic interests become spatialized and canalized 
into specific economic sectors and activities, and groups encounter discrimina-
tion on the basis of cultural differences. But ethnic politics only head towards 
becoming nationalism when these issues can coalesce into a viable set of 
combined claims to identity, territory, and jurisdiction. There are ambiguous 
cases, such as Scotland in the United Kingdom, or Quebec in Canada, where 
the overarching state has granted (or conceded) an exceptional degree of self-
government within that frame to culturally-defined territories, and in which 
pressures for greater autonomy continue. Michael Hechter has coined the term 
“governance units” to talk about these cases that are not quite states, but defined 
to a degree in terms of distinct territory and jurisdiction.21
The central thrust of my remarks is away from treating nationalism thinly, 
simply as culturally-marked political mobilization, and rather more thickly, as 
the historical accompaniment of the modern state, and of a world in which 
bids for statehood will continue. It is to question more exotic readings of na-
tionalism as ethnic extremism and as political reaction, and to view it more as 
a normal part of modern politics—one we must own and take responsibility 
for. Nationalism and national identities are unlikely to go away any time soon. 
We are inclined to be untroubled by those versions that we take for granted. 
Nation-states and nationalisms need to be recognized as basic compositional 
factors in the globalization process, shaping interests, worldviews, and social 
conflicts. The practical, global political question is not whether we can get past 
them, but rather how we negotiate between them, and how they are linked to, 
…the modern nation-state distinctively 
gets its legitimacy from below—from the 
mass of the ruled population—but how 
it secures that legitimacy… can vary in 
consequential and dangerous ways.
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and interact with, the various forms of organized political and economic power 
that constitute the process of globalization.
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